Opening Statement of GPH Panel Chair During the GPH-MILF 21st Formal Exploratory Talks

Opening Statement of GPH Panel Chair During the GPH-MILF 21st Formal Exploratory Talks


Dean Marvic Leonen
GPH Panel Chair for MILF Talks
21st Exploratory Talks
April 27, 2011
Sheraton Hotel, Kuala Lumpur


Assalamu alaikum wa rahmatullahi wa barakatuh


Twenty four (24): that is the number of consultations that our panel has done in the past few months--not 2 as often mistakenly reported. Counted here are the many informal meetings with various sectors that we chose not to make public so that we could truly have a frank and candid exchange of hopes and aspirations, ideals and pragmatic results, ideas and approaches that can help validate our position on countless issues. Counted here are consultations which are necessary to discharge our duties the way we should--that is, with the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate and some local government officials.


Not counted on the 24 are the many one on one conversations that panel members have had with key individuals. I have even sought to meet some journalists for a sit down to pick their thoughts on some issues which I feel they may have some knowledge. Not counted here are the meetings of cabinet clusters and of course our meetings with the President. The day before we left for Kuala Lumpur, we even had an initial meeting with leaders of the Liberal Party itself. I can only describe it as a candid yet interesting meeting yet I remain hopeful.


And our schedules are full the next few weeks: meetings which range from command conferences of the area commands in Mindanao, consultations with local government officials, to meetings with legislators, former justices, cabinet clusters and of course with our direct principal, the President.


We have no illusions that our own requirements for consultation will be easy. But if we are to truly learn from the mistakes of the past, we do need to have the patience to deliberately seek out many groups, receiving and discussing their sentiments in many different types of forums, many times clarifying perspectives. Of course, we do not seek universal consensus. What we are trying to achieve after all is a political settlement which should embody what we in government can deliver.


We applaud the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s decision to conduct consultations with non-Moro groups including indigenous peoples and business groups. We understand that you have schedules with the Makati Business Club and many other prominent Manila based organizations after this round of talks. As I have stated informally with some members of civil society, this decision to come out publicly with the contours of your proposed Comprehensive Compact should cause a national discussion on a national issue: how to solve the Bangsamoro problem. It can complement our efforts. It will also help us--and our direct principal--to gauge the public pulse on political decisions that need to be taken. Your consultations are complementary to ours.


We want to bring some outcomes of these consultations directly in this 21st Exploratory Talks.


First, we were handed the results of extensive consultations with Indigenous Peoples by the Mindanao Peace Caucus. We are making this paper available to the parties as a non-paper. To us, a non-paper is a document which may be of direct relevance to the negotiations. It may contain ideas authored by them or by some other third party or groups of parties but does not necessarily reflect the current position of either the GPH or the MILF. We invite our counterparts to study it closely as an aid to understanding what some organized groups of Indigenous Peoples expect from these negotiations.


Second, there were suggestions made that we do joint forums. We feel that this is a good idea at some point in the negotiations perhaps, when we (and our principals) achieve some clarity in our fundamental agreements and right before we mutually make the final commitments. I understand that there is precedent for this in this negotiations as there was some form of joint advocacy group in the past. We will take this up again in future negotiations.


Third, so that we can more easily communicate progress in these negotiations to our publics, we are requesting that our panel be allowed to have a maximum of four observers apart from our panel and our secretariat. The observers may be members of our advisory committee or key members of Congress or even individuals who we need to consult time and again. We may need to invite personalities who sit in the other tables that the GPH has set up, i.e. the talks on the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF. The observers will be here only to watch and see the progress of the discussion (inclusive of all its passion) in real time. They will come at our own cost and they need not join all the agenda items. Who will sit as observers will be up to our panel to decide. To us, this will hasten consensus building. We have raised this already as part of the pre-meeting and there was some sort of consensus.


Most of these related matters can be easily disposed of if the MILF reconsiders its current position not to table for discussion our earlier proposal to convene a technical working group that will meet in between our meetings to work on these administrative matters. As we have indicated in the past, an articulated and written Agreement on the Conduct of Talks will not only clarify how we work in the framework of these negotiations it will also help us communicate to our constituencies the ground rules in the negotiation. We have made all of our agreements public. It was made possible because all of them were articulated and written. The only exception to this is what remains in oral tradition: the conduct of our talks.


We thank you for allowing us in this round of talks to query you on the Revised Comprehensive Compact that you submitted as a statement of your position. We hope that you would take our questions in the spirit in which we have to make them: to elicit your interpretation so that we or our principals will not second guess what your initial positions are. You will see in our questions the levels of detail we went as we combed through your proposals. We have put into it the diligence that it deserves knowing the kind of work that you have already put into it. Please understand that we too have been working on our own proposals at many levels of our bureaucracy.


Except for extraordinary reasons, our ideal for a final agreement is that it is brief but clear and determinate as to what our principals promise. We should always be on guard for text that may contain different meanings to both parties. They may just be pitfalls for future misunderstanding and more serious conflicts. After all, we share with you the hope that we do not sign an agreement solely because we want an agreement. We want an agreement that is workable on all levels while addressing most of the fundamental interests in a principled way.


The workability of any final agreement hinges on many things. Let me just, at this time flag two of them:

One. We all know that the government has signed a Final Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Over much of the same ground and in representation of the same peoples, government is now purposely and seriously negotiating with a different movement. Our task is to come to a final agreement with the MILF. However, as early as this round, we hope that the MILF can consider the offshoots of this situation as a problem that we can also mutually address. On our end, we hope that a final negotiated political settlement with the MILF is not mutually exclusive to a convergence of government’s commitment to both MNLF and MILF. Also, we hope that the MNLF and the MILF’s commitment, both representing the Bangsamoro peoples, should not be at cross purposes with each other. We know that the solution to this lies both with government and with the MILF’s dealings with the MNLF.

Two. It is safe to say at this point that it would, most likely, be difficult to get the needed political critical mass to implement an agreement of the magnitude that is implied your Revised Comprehensive Compact if there are unaddressed splinter groups from your movement. The questions that we have had to answer these past few months are: “After the GPH signs an agreement with the MILF, will it then have to set up another table to negotiate with the BIFF? Is the BIFF still part of the MILF? If it is, which has the true command over the MILF’s coercive forces, the BIAF or the BIFF? What assurances do we have that the BIFF, if no longer MILF, will respect our ceasefire with the MILF? Or, do we have to set up a separate ceasefire infrastructure for the BIFF? Which has the greater constituency, the MILF or the BIFF in the areas of operation of Ustadz Amiril Umra Kato? These are questions that were asked of us and I am just summarizing it here.


We are aware of an independent report on Kato that have been provided to both parties. Sadly, they do not address these concerns. We hope that in this round we can have a full satisfactory answer.


We are here to negotiate ways to solve problems. That principally requires that we are open to seeing the problem realistically. Each of our sides can see portions of that reality. Let us reconstruct and review it in this table, candidly and always with an eye to what we mutually aspire: meaningful freedoms within a just and democratic society. Our peoples deserve nothing less.


Thank you.#